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The Kosovo MACC: 
11The Most Successful Mine Action 
Program Ever" 
Using groundbreaking new ideas and ingenious combinations of favorite 
demining methods, the Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) 
has succeeded in clearing the province of landmines in less than three years. 
Mr. John Flanagan, MACC Program Manager, offers insights on the MACC's 
accomplishments and a vision for the future of mine action. 
by JJ Scott, MAIC 
Introduction 
June I 0, 1999: The NATO Secre-
tary General announced the suspension 
of NATO air strikes in Kosovo. After 
seven days o f rele ntless bombing, 
Yugoslav and Serbian forces had agreed 
ro withdraw from Kosovar territory, clear-
ing the way for deploymem of United 
Nations (UN) peacekeepers, the Kosovo 
Stabilization Force (KFOR). Simulta-
neously, the UN declared the establish-
ment of the UN lnrerim Administration 
for Kosovo (UNMIK), mandating that 
this body "promote an atmosphere of se-
curity and safety that will enable all refu-
gees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) ro enjoy the right ro return freely 
ro their homes and to live in conditions 
in which the highest standards of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms are re-
spected."1 The UN Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS) recognized the threat that 
landmines and UXO posed to the suc-
cess of this goal and set about developing 
a program to deal with these hazards. 
One week later, with KFOR en-
trenched and the Serbians extracted, the 
Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Cen-
ter (MACC) opened for business with 
John Flanagan serving as the MACC's 
Program Manager. Under his leadersh ip, 
the Kosovo demining program swept the 
counrry clean of threatening landmines 
and UXO in just over two years, an un-
precedented achievement. In December 
2001, Mr. Flanagan declared Kosovo's 
UXO threat ro be comparable ro that of 
any other European country, thus accom-
plishing the MACC's primary mission. 
Although Kosovo's iniriallandmine 
and UXO situation was unique in some 
respects, several lessons learned there can 
be applied to future mine anion pro-
grams (MAPs). Mr. Flanagan believes that 
if every MAP used demining methods 
appropriate to their unique situations, the 
worldwide landmine problem could be 
solved in a relatively short rime-much 
shorter than most in the dem ining com-
munity consider possible. Some of his 
insights are introduced below as I out-
line the Kosovo MACC from top to bot-
tom, hopefully illuminating all of the 
imaginative answers this program used to 
solve mine action's toughest questions. 
The Kosovo MACC 
Organization 
With only seven days elapsing be-
tween conception and implementation of 
the program, it is amazing just how many 
acronyms stand between the UN and the 
Kosovo MACC. The UN established 
UNMIK and gave the administration a 
mandate that included providing for the 
safe return of thousands ofiDPs. Because 
landmines and UXO presented such a 
hazard ro returning civilians, UNMAS 
became involved. Officials at UNMAS 
chose the UN Office for Program Ser-
vices (UNOPS) ro design an UNMIK 
Mine Action Program (MAP), which they 
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charged with all coordination acnvltles 
surrounding the deminingofKosovo. That 
MAP became known as the Kosovo MACC. 
As a coordinating body, the MACC 
had no demining assets of its own, in-
stead relying on other organizations to 
carry out all operations. Mr. Flanagan 
explained, "One of the key differences in 
the establishment of the Kosovo MACC 
was the extra 'C' in our title. The MACC 
was deliberately set up as a 'coordination' 
center, rather than the more traditional 
mine action center." Other UN depart-
ments, NGOs and corporations provided 
all deployable machinery, manpower and 
commodities. This setup allowed each 
organization ro focus on irs specialty ar-
eas while rhe MACC worked on integrat-
ing all activities. For example, while 
MINE-TECH performed deminingop-
erarions in western Kosovo on land pre-
viously surveyed by the HALO Trust, the 
Inte rnational Committee of the Red 
C ross (ICRC) and Handicap Interna-
tional (HI) simultaneously conducted 
mine awareness and victim assistance pro-
grams in the same areas. The MACC con-
centrated solely on directing the work of 
all organizations involved ro ensure maxi-
mum efficiency. 
A new "Senior Partner" system was 
also implemented by the MACC ro help 
spread authority and coordination re-
sponsibilities among the different orga-
nizations assisting in each of the many 
facets of mine action. Under chis arrange-
ment, some of the major clearance and 
awareness organizations acted as coordi-
narors at the local level, rhus eliminating 
unnecessary additional infrastructure and 
personnel costs. This scenario also gave 
these organizations a sense of pride and 
ownership over their parts of the pro-
gram, theoretically increasing the qual-
ity of their work. 
-
Mission Statement 
The MACC's stared goals were de-
ceptively simple and srraightforward: 
"Replicate the situation that exists in vir-
rually all European countries that have 
experienced conA ict during rhe 20'h Cen-
tury;" and do it within three years. 2 In this 
condition, citizens may periodically find 
scattered mines and UXO remaining af-
ter clearance, bur they have been trained 
to safely handle the situation. Ltndmines 
and UXO pose only rhe smallest threat 
to civi lians as they go about rebuilding 
their economic and social lives. The goal 
in Kosovo was not 1 00 percent clearance. 
The MACC estimated that completely 
clearing the entire country would have 
taken 30 to 50 years usi ng standard 
manual demining methods. Obviously, 
that rime frame would not allow Kosovo 
to rebuild in a timely manner. So the 
MACC adopted a differenr tactic, trad-
ing a I 00 percent safety guaranree (after 
five decades) for the immediate improve-
ment of most Kosovars' lives and a small 
amount of residual risk. The MACC at-
tempted to minimize civilian impact as 
quickly and effic iently as possible, thus 
helping the most people in the least 
amount of rime. Realizing this goal re-
quired some innovative methodology by 
the MACC, as no previous MAP had ever 
laid out such ambitious goals within such 
a limi ted rimeframe. 
The MACC's Five 
Principles 
The Kosovo MACC quickly estab-
lished five principles to form the foun-
dation upon which ro build the rest of 
rhe program. Stressing efficiency, speed 
and safety, the MACC focused on: 
• Integrated Mine Action 
• Information Managemenr 
• Th rear Assessment 
• Risk Management 
• Quality Management 
Using new srrategies and proven 
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techniques, the Kosovo MACC delivered 
on irs promises by following these prin-
ciples faithfully. Examples of the novel 
combinations used by the MACC are 
outlined below. 
Integration 
The MACC needed to address each 
of the four pillars of mine action-mine 
clearance, mine awareness, victim assis-
tance and advocacy-and they needed to 
do it quickly and efficiently. They soon 
determined that they needed to integrate 
mine acrion acnvntes on an unprec-
edented scale. Effective integration in-
volves the concurrent execution of vari-
ous aspects of mine action to eliminate 
redundancy and wasted effort. For ex-
ample, groups might co nduct mine 
awareness simultaneously with demining 
operations in a village, as explained above. 
Effectively in regrating all four pillars al-
lowed rhe MACC to accomplish their 
lofty goals with unsurpassed effi ciency. 
• A Bosnian deminer 
gently probes for 
landmines during 
an exercise with live 
ordinance. c/o AP 
1
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• A"booby trap" 
mine. c/o UN/ 
UNHCR 
Information Management 
Integrat ion on rhe scale rhar the 
Kosovo MACC dealt with required a new 
system for informacion management. To 
coordinate the survey reams and m ine 
awareness groups with the multiple 
NGOs carrying our the actual demining, 
the MACC had to process vast amounts 
of raw data and then distribute usefu l 
informacion to people in the field in a 
timely manner. This would be a daunt-
ing task anywhere, bur in rhe decimated 
counrry of Kosovo, ir cou ld have been a 
nightmare. Luckily, the Geneva I nrerna-
tional Ce nte r for Human i tarian 
Demining (G IC HD) stepped in with 
their newly developed Informa tion Man-
agemem Sysrem for Mine Action (JMSMA). 
IMSMA provides the emire mine 
action community with a standardized re-
posirory for data. Everyone participating 
in a mine action project-survey rakers, 
dem iners, and those involved with mine 
awareness and victim assistance-gath-
ers rhe same statistics from every area 
withi n rhe work zone and subm its them 
ro rhe IMSMA database. Using this stan-
dardized data, IMSMA all ows coordina-
tOrs to dramatically increase their effi-
ciency. Managers can analyze da ta, view 
graphs and charts of a ll data, plot geo-
graphic maps of mine fields, keep track 
of all mine action activities, and view 
compilations of any statistics they wish, 
all within rhe same system. "It enabled 
us ro coll ate and analyze a mass ive 
amount of data in a very short period of 
rime and allowed the hands-on manage-
menr of clearance and m ine awareness 
activities," Mr. Flanagan explained. 
In Kosovo, the MACC had ro take 
care not to repeat activities already com-
pleted by KFOR during their own mili-
ta ry demin ing activities. KFOR con-
ducted su rveys ro locate mined areas and 
to determine the accuracy of other re-
ports; both are activities that rhe MACC 
itself might otherwise have needed co do. 
Fortuna tely, KFOR agreed to use the 
IMSMA database, rhus allowing all of 
their mine action-related data co be com-
piled along with rhe MACCs. To ensure 
rapid distribution of th is processed in-
formatio n within Kosovo, rhe MACC es-
tablished regularly updated satellite of-
fices throughout the cou n try. Some 
NGOs also ser up information centers for 
local populations, allowing civilians to 
access landmine and UXO data about 
their own community without traveling 
long disrances.3 
Though invaluable, the IMSMA sys-
tem was nor flawless. Working with rhe 
GICHD, the MACC Informacion Tech-
nology Branch assisted in the develop-
ment of a new version of the system. Ac-
cording to Mr. Flanagan, "version 2.2 is 
s ign ifican tly better chan the version 1. 1 
m odel initiall y deployed in Kosovo." 
Most UN demining programs now use 
chis vastly improved version ofiMSMA. 
Threat Assessment 
When civil ians see a truck burdened 
with crates oflandmines barrel past rhem, 
and ch en observe overturned dirt or 
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empty crates in a nearby meadow, that 
meadow becomes a m ine field. When 
something-anything-goes bang!, rhe 
entire surrounding area becomes a mine 
field. Landmines frighten people, so 
when a rumor gets starred about mines, 
people rend ro exaggerate the size of the 
affected area when reporting it ro authori-
ties or even create imaginary mine fields 
where none exist. D id rhar truck simply 
deliver those crates of mines to some 
warehouse without ever planting them? 
Was that only a random p iece of UXO 
rhar exploded in the field, dangerous bur 
not requiring the comm irmenr of a full-
scale demining contingent? Previously, it 
didn't matter in humanitarian demining, 
because every reported mine field got t he 
same assets thrown at ir, leaving deminers 
to discover that sometimes the mines 
they'd been hunting never actually ex-
isted. Ghost mine fields drained resources 
just as fast as rhe real thing. 
At first, ghost mine fields posed a 
real problem to the MACC's goals. The 
Kosovo MACC needed a way to quickly 
confirm o r discredit reponed mine fields 
to help them disuibure assets in rhe mosr 
efficienr manner possible. Instead of a 
cookie-curter mentality (using rhe same 
solution for every problem), rhey custom-
ized their approach depending o n the 
si tuation. Surveys have always been a nec-
essary component of any demin ing pro-
gram, and rhe Kosovo program was no 
different. Level One surveys helped rhe 
MACC to subsranriare or discredit civil-
ian- reported mine fields. The MACC 
devised a sysrem that divided Kosovo inro 
320 distinct districts and then assigned 
each d istrict a mine impact raring ofh igh, 
low, or ni l. This level of p recision allowed 
rhe MACC ro cusromize their response 
to an unprecedented degree. 
Befo re committing resources, rhe 
MACC followed up with Level Two sur-
veys ro determine exactly which land in 
a suspected mine field anually contained 
mines. Quire often, surveyors discovered 
char suspect contaminated areas were de-
void of m ines. O ther fields were mined 
at such a low level rhar the MACC 
deemed full-scale deployment of forces 
unnecessary. Determining the mine den-
sity in each field ensured an efficienr dis-
tribution of assets. 
-
Risk Management 
"Our mantra within rhe MACC was 
'We're nor going co prod our way across 
Kosovo'," announced Mr. Flanagan. This 
slogan is another example of the MACC's 
efforts ro get things done in rhe most ef-
ficient way possible, even if they had to 
abandon some standard practices. Many 
demining practit ioners feel that manual 
demining is rhe surest, safest and most 
depen dable method of clearing mine 
fields. While th is may be rrue, manual 
demining is also often the slowest and 
least efficient demining method, a fact 
recognized by the MACC. In accordance 
with rheir stared goal of clearing more 
land faster, the MACC employed mine 
detecting dogs (MODs), mechanical sys-
tems and manual teams in various com-
binations, depending on rhe situation. 
While realizing that utilizing meth-
ods other than manual demining might 
have left a slightly greater percentage of 
mines/UXO after clearance, rhe MACC 
decided that the speed and efficiency ben-
efits granted by such systems far our-
weighed any increase in risk. Adopting 
this policy required rhar the MACC break 
from some standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) during their demining exercises. 
Mr. Flanagan assured me that SOPs were 
nor recklessly broken, "bur we did not 
slavishly adhere ro procedures if they 
could be safely modified to increase effi-
ciency and productivity." He further ex-
plained that rhe MACC's Quality Assur-
ance Officer had to approve every devia-
tion from SOPs, "and would nor do so if 
there was any question about the safety 
or applicabil ity of the action." 
Quality Management 
Considering the compromises made 
for the sake of speed and efficiency, rhe 
Kosovo MACC pur special emphasis on 
their quality assurance program. The 
MACC designed the program ro ensure 
that all a reas declared safe were in fac t 
cleared to the appropriate standards. Only 
through such a program could the 
MACC safely maintain irs desired bal-
ance between safety and speed. 
Five Quality Assurance (QA) reams 
rorared th rough each of the clearance ar-
eas on a regular schedule, focus ing on 
specific, well-defined areas during each 
visit. QA teams had rwo goals: make sure 
clemining reams operated safely co pre-
vent their own injuries, and make sure 
they operated thoroughly to prevent ci-
vilian injuries after clearance was con-
cluded. The QA reams achieved both 
goals by ensuring that each clearance op-
eration adhered to irs MACC-approved 
SOPs. "This is based on the notion rhar 
if correct procedures are followed, m ine 
clearance is a relatively mechanical, safe 
activity" for deminers and civil ians alike, 
Mr. Flanagan explained. QA teams acted 
as "communi ty constables, nor riot po-
lice. Their job was to identify problems 
Acronyms 
nared all mine action activities, but other 
organizations carried our all actual opera-
tions. Once again, rhe MACC's manage-
ment methods sometimes strayed from 
the accepted norm, but their imaginative 
initiatives proved effective and successful. 
Mine Clearance 
Clearance operations are rhe heart 
of any Mine Action operation. Remov-
ing a landmine from the ground is the 
only way to guarantee that it never cla ims 
a victim. In Kosovo, the MACC had to 
contend with mines laid by three differ-
ent factions: the Kosovo Liberation Army 












UN Interim Administration for Kosovo 
UN M ine Action Service 
Mine Action Program 
Mine Action Coordination Center 
Information Management System for Mine Action 
Mine Detection Dogs 
Cluster Bomb Unit 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Kosovo Stabilization Force; UN Peacekeepers 
Kosovo Liberation Army 
Serbian Special Police 
VJ Vojska Jugoslavic; The Yugoslav Army 
in rheir infancy, before they caused ma-
jor catastrophes," he continued . In 
demining, catastrophes equal unneces-
sary, preventable injury and/or death for 
workers or civi I ians. Each QA ream 
worked to eliminate the possibili ty of any 
such occurrence. 
Mine Clearance, Mine 
Awareness and Victim 
Assistance in Kosovo 
The MACC's five guiding prin-
ciples-integrated mine action, informa-
tion management, threat assessment, risk 
management and quality management-
appl ied to each of the four pillars of Mine 
Action addressed in Kosovo. While they 
did nor emphasize advocacy, rhe MACC 
was heavily involved with clearance, 
aware ness and victim assistance in 
Kosovo. Remember, rhe MACC coordi-
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and rhe Vojska Jugoslavic (VJ). The VJ 
provided rhe MACC with 620 mine field 
records of varying accuracy and compre-
hensiveness. Says Mr. Flanagan, "the 
maps provided by the VJ proved invalu-
able as a guide for determining the scope 
and nature of each mine clearance task." 
When used in conju nction with all other 
information sources, rhe maps allowed 
the MACC to ger a fairly accurate idea 
of where mines might lie in wait. Dis-
cernible patterns in VJ mine fields also 
greatly assisted demining operations, 
since rhe VJ had p lanted the vast major-
ity of the mines found by the MACC. 
The MUP specialized in laying small 
numbers of unmarked nuisance mines 
throughout villages and around essential 
i nfrasrrucru re elemen rs. These stray 
mines proved particularly troublesome as 
their dangerous positioning bur low den-
sity made their removal both necessary 
2






and inefficient. Again, experienced 
deminers could sometimes detect pat-
terns even without any records. This dem-
onstrates the remarkable level of experi-
ence and competence displayed by some 
of the demining organizations. These 
guys were good. 
The KLA reported clearing a lim i nes 
they had laid during the war, and 
deminers in the field generally confirmed 
this claim. Only a few mine fie lds dis-
covered in Kosovo could be attributed to 
Kl.A activities. Though all data provided 
by combatants helped, the maps and in-
formation given to the MACC men-
tioned only 624 of the nearly 2,500 mine-
suspected areas reported by civilians. This 
fact shows the importance of the MACC's 
own surveys in determining the severity 
of each district's landmine problem. 
Sometimes soldiers have berrer things to 
do than mark mine field maps as accu-
rately as possible. 
D espite troubles with maps provided 
by each fact ion, the demining groups 
working under the MACC neutralized 
thousands of landmines in Kosovo. By 
November of 200 I, with 93 percent of 
demining activities completed , these 
groups had prevented 23,359 landmines 
from injuring any living creature. ln the 
process, the MACC declared 30.5 mil-
lion square meters of land free from the 
impact of mines, thus allowing inhabit-
ants of these areas to resume normallife.4 
Landmines are never the only devices 
rhar humanitarian deminers must con-
rend with, as any piece of UXO can act 
as a mine by indiscriminately exploding 
when discu rbed. This proved especially 
true in Kosovo. NATO forces relied 
heavily on cluster bomb uni ts (CBUs) 
during their air campaign, and remnants 
of these insidious devices-many still po-
tentially explosive-littered large swaths 
of the Kosovo landscape after t he war. 
CBUs consist of a several-foot-long metal 
housing shaped like a conventional 
bomb, bur instead of containing a single 
warhead, each C BU conceals hu ndreds 
of sma lle r warheads. Each of these 
bomblets, as they are called, is capable of 
significant destruction. 
D eminers hare CBUs for two rea-
sons: First, they are designed to disperse 
their devastating parcels over a large area 
so rhey can destroy more enemy assets 
than is possible with conventional, single-
warhead bombs. Second, and more sig-
nificant ro deminers, the bomblers re-
leased by C BUs don't always explode. 
Military sources acknowledge a fai lu re 
rare of five to seven percent, meaning rhat 
abou t s ix percent of all bomblers reach 
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the ground intact, spread over a large area, 
still armed and ready to kill . Bad as rh is 
sounds, many deminers report char true 
failure rates are probably 15-20 percent. 
One our of every five bomblers landing 
intact means huge problems for humani-
tarian deminers, and Kosovo proved no 
different. In addition to their abundance 
and pervasiveness throughout Kosovo, 
CBU bomblers are also much more frag-
ile than most other explosive devices. 
Whereas landmines must be triggered by 
weight or tripwire, a bombler may ex-
plode from even the most cautious han-
dling. Often exploding them in place is 
rhe only safe way to deal with bomblets. 
NATO provided coordinates for 333 
rargered areas over which allied planes 
dropped 1392 CBUs. Within rarger ar-
eas, deminers discovered colossal strips of 
land saru ra red wirh shrapnel , shattered 
machinery and still-active bomblers. This 
metal-strewn environment greatly com-
plicates the use of metal detectors, lead-
ing to an increased reliance on dogs and 
other methods. Some bomblets were 
found in racr and still armed mo re than 
50cm below the surface, and dem iners 
d iscovered one complete CBU over rwo 
meters deep!~ By November 2001, 
deminers in Kosovo had disposed of over 
20,000 bomblets and orher UXO. 
NATO member nations covered much 
of the clearance costs for the CBUs they 
dropped through bilateral funding. 
The demining organizations in 
Kosovo used all assets available ro rhem 
over rhe duration of the operation. 
M anual deminers, MDDs, and machines 
all played prominent roles in rhe field. 
Manual deminers and dogs rook rhe lead 
by findi ng most of the mines, whi le ma-
chines played more of a supporr/QA ro le. 
Demining organizations operating under 
rhe MACC u ed four diverse flail systems, 
employing each strictly within irs speci-
fi cations. After dem in ers removed all 
idencified rows of mines, the flails 
pounded th rough and ensured rhar no 
mines remained hidden outside of or be-
tween the rows. If a machine did strike a 
mine in a previously cleared area, an in-
vestigation fo llowed immediately to de-
termine why the mine still lingered and 
whar remedial actions needed to be taken. 
Huge Pearson rollers mounted on 
... 
armored loaders played a verification role 
in areas where locals refused to use large 
srrerches of land because they'd "heard" 
chat a mine field existed in rhe area. As 
mentioned above, these ghost mine fie lds 
could have eaten up huge amoums of the 
MACC's resources if deminers had to 
manually investigate each one. Instead, 
the rollers were deployed to quickly verifY 
the absence of mines. Mr. Flanagan com-
mented, "We named this sort of clear-
ance 'peace of mine( d) clearance'," si nee 
no mines were actually removed because 
they had never existed! 
T he MACC had to prove that the 
land was mine-free in order to return it 
ro productive use. Large machines may 
nor be well suited to many dem ining 
casks, but their utility in these verifica-
tion roles clearly showed that machines 
can bring va lue to a demi ning operation, 
provided they are used only with in their 
specifications. Mr. Flanagan summed up 
rhe MACC's approach to mine clearance 
in Kosovo by reiterating the MACC's core 
commi tments: "We used a combination 
of manual, MDD, and mechanical sys-
tems and evaluated rhe best approaches 
to ensure that we created an appropriate, 
integrated solution for each specific activity." 
Looking forward to the evenrual ex-
tract io n o f all MACC-supervised 
dem in i ng organ izarions, Handicap Inter-
nario nal (HI ) began train ing a local 
dem ining capacity in August of 200 I. 
Known as rhe Kosovo Protection Corps 
(KPC), these men rook over res idual 
demining operations once the MACC 
had finished. Whenever a civilian spots a 
landmine or UXO fro m now on, they 
must notifY rhe KPC ro take care of i r. 
Obviously, the MACC worked very hard 
to ensure that these men do not receive 
much work. 
Mine Awareness 
W hil e deminers surveyed and 
cleared rowns and surrounding areas of 
landmines and UXO, other organizations 
conducted mine awareness campaigns, 
informing civilians of the dangers posed 
by the explosive devices strewn about 
their war-torn communities. Many civil-
ians are simply unaware of the dangers 
posed by land mines in their area, so they 
act in ways that elevate their risk for in-
jury or death. Mine awareness programs 
rell civilians where mines or UXO are 
buried, what dangers these devices rep-
resent and what ro do if they spot an 
unmarked landmine, all with rhe in renr 
of changing risky behaviors to prevenr 
unnecessary casualties. 
The MACC designed two mine 
awareness programs for Kosovo: the Safer 
Village concept and rhe Child-to-Ch ild 
program. Each program attacked rhc 
mine awareness problem from a differ-
ent angle, bur their overriding goal was 
rhe same: educate civilians (especially 
children) to avoid preventable deaths due 
to landmines. The Safer Village concept 
looked at each village in isolation and 
then developed specific recommenda-
tions ro help citizens identifY and elimi-
nate their hazardous behaviors. The 
Child-to-Child program rook advantage 
of children's p ropensity to share every-
thing they know with their friends. Pro-
gram organizers taught groups of children 
to avoid mine-suspected areas and what 
to do if they did come across an un-
marked mine. These children rhen passed 
on the information at school and at home 
while organizers reinforced the lessons 
through traditional activities. 
As clearance progressed, rhe main 
message changed from avoidance of 
mined areas to the safe reporting of stray 
mines and UXO. Trainers taught the chil-
dren to report all suspicious materials ro 
rhe police, KFOR or JC RC volunteers. 
Both programs proved extremely effec-
tive, as casualties dropped nearly every 
month for their duration. 
Victim Assistance 
Neither mine clearance nor m1ne 
awareness programs can prevent all mine/ 
UXO accidenrs. Several agencies special-
ized in help ing landmine survivors with 
their recovery and eventual reintegration 
into society. In Kosovo, rhe World H ealrh 
Organization (WHO ) rook rhe lead, with 
assistance from the ICRC, HI and rhe 
Mother Theresa Society. Recovery andre-
habilitation activities rely heavily on 
sound infrastructure, and the run-down 
state of many Kosovar buildings certainly 
retarded these groups' efforts. The 
MACC's primary victim assistance goal 
was to rebuild a national capacity to al-
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low Kosovars to care for their fallen com-
rades with their own means. 
A countrywide survey of all known 
landmine/UXO survivors in Kosovo also 
fell under the auspices of the victim as-
sistance program. This investigation ob-
tained baseline data to paint a fuller pic-
mre of rhe socio-economic and psycho-
social needs of affected Kosovars. Analy-
sis of the gathered data allowed for more 
effective and efficient planning, rhus fur-
thering the MACC's overriding goals of 
speed, efficiency, and safery.6 
Unusual Circumstances 
Throughout the HD community, 
there has been an ompouring of praise 
for the Kosovo MACC and irs manage-
ment ream. While the MACC was cer-
tainly an undeniable success, we must 
note some of the unique circumstances 
that contri buted significantly to the 
MACC's achievements. Per haps rhe most 
visible factor was the veritable avalanche 
of aid char initially descended upon the 
MACC. The war in Kosovo was ex-
tremely high profile and included many 
of the world's major players, which led 
to high donor interest from the outset. 
"Thanks to the efforts of a number of 
donors, equipment, personnel and opera-
tional clearance capabil ities were provided 
in a rapid manner," Mr. Flanagan noted . . 
But rhe avalanche of aid proved typically 
short-lived. As with many demining op-
erations, donations tailed off at the end 
of the mission, bu r rhe MACC's ingenu-
ity pulled the program through rhe rough 
rimes. Said Mr. Flanagan, "Ar rimes we 
were basically cash-strapped ... but at the 
end of the year the task was completed." 
And that's all that matters. 
Kosovo was a disaster area when the 
MACC first became operational, lacking 
many basic governmental services. 
Though this was surely detrimental in 
many regards, it also allowed the UN to 
act unimpeded by local authorities. Along 
with functional roads, health care services 
and governmental offices, red rape sim-
ply did not exist in Kosovo by the rime 
the MACC arrived. The UN observed the 
situation, decided what was necessary and 
implemented the program with un-
matched efficiency. Likewise, the MACC 
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did not have to worry about much resis-
tance or interference from local leaders. 
Finally, though mines and UXO 
saturated Kosovo, the province itself is 
relatively small, leaving less area to scour 
than in many other operations. The 
landmine problem was also fairly recent 
in Kosovo, so no 50-year-old mines were 
around to discover in long-forgonen ar-
eas. People generally had a good idea of 
which areas were mined and which were 
clear, and combatants provided maps to 
complement people's memories. When all 
available information was collected and 
ana lyzed using the IMSMA system, the 
MACC found it fairly easy to determine 
which areas required clearance and which 
resources to use. 
That being said, the significance of 
the MACC's accomplishments cannot be 
overemphasized. Mr. Flanagan himself 
declared the MACC to be "the most suc-
cessful MAP ever implemented by the 
UN." A bold statement to be sure, bur 
who would argue? As Mr. Flanagan re-
minded me, "thi s was the first time that 
the UN had actually started and com-
pleted a mine action program through its 
stated objectives." The MACC earned 
laudatory comments for its effective man-
agement strategies, early adoption and 
thorough implementation of the IMSMA 
system, and the declaration of unambigu-
ous and attainable goals. Remarking on 
the nearly universal praise garnered by the 
MACC, he added: "I believe that almost 
all those who worked under the UN 
umbrella during the program in Kosovo 
would agree" that the MACC was an ab-
solute success. 
Lessons Learned and the 
Future of Mine Action 
Though the circumstances sur-
rounding the MACC's implementation 
were rather unique, some of the lessons 
learned in Kosovo are applicable to fu-
ture MAPs. Mr. Flanagan informed me 
that the overall strucwre of the Kosovo 
MACC is being imitated in Lebanon and 
Eritrea, since "there are certain principles 
that should be applied wherever possible." 
However, he stressed that the most im-
portant lesson from Kosovo "is that there 
is no template solution in mine action." 
The most effecti ve tactic used by the 
MACC was the design and implementa-
tion of a" Kosovo solution to the Kosovo 
problem." Integration and effective in-
formacion management allowed the com-
plete customization of the MACC-Ied 
program, the flexibility of which led in 
turn to unmatched speed, efficiency, safety 
and success throughout the operation. 
Mine action is often presented as an 
impossible problem. We've all heard that 
there are bi llions of landmines covering 
entire continents, completely eliminating 
populations, and that their removal may 
very well rake till the end of time. Yes, 
I'm exaggerating, but my hyperbole is 
on ly sl ightly inflated when compared to 
the numbers frequently reported by ad-
vocacy groups, numbers that get frequent 
exposure in the press, accuracy be 
damned. Mr. Flanagan chooses to look 
at the land mine problem from a much 
different, much more optimistic and 
practical outlook. "! firmly believe that 
the problem of mine contamination can 
be rapidly brought under control in the 
vast majority of affected countries using 
existing technologies and techniques if 
each program is properly managed and 
implemented. An integrated approach is 
critical," he declared. Obviously, he bases 
this statement on the recent success of 
the Kosovo MACC, bur the wisdom to 
that approach cannot be denied. 
Mr. Flanagan is not an overly opti-
mistic dreamer when it comes to mine 
action though, either. He sees a very small 
window of opportunity open ro the 
deminingworld righr now, a window that 
may slam shut unless the HD commu-
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niry can come up with a suing of suc-
cesses now. If other projects are not 
wrapped up quickly and successfully, 
"then there is a strong possibility chat 
donors will become disillusioned and in-
terest in the topic will wane," he prophesies. 
W ith world acrention currently fo-
cused on Afghanistan and the landmine 
siwar ion there, the stage is set for a flurry 
of demining activities throughout the 
world. Flush with his recent, hard-earned 
success, Mr. Flanagan manages to see a 
light at the end of the demining tunnel, 
much nearer than many others in the field 
would suspect. "If all the resources that 
are currently being frittered away through 
disjointed, inefficient or otherwise waste-
ful projects were brought to bear as part 
of a coordinated efforr, the problem could 
essentially be solved in a ten-year period," 
he claims. Here's hoping that all other 
MAPs throughout the world can achieve 
the same success that Mr. Flanagan and 
the Kosovo MACC have, because only 
then will the world enjoy the reality of Mr. 
Flanagan's inspiring ten-year vision: a world 
free from the impact of landmines.• 
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The Mine Action 
Program in 
Afghanistan 
The United Nation's Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) combines 
the efforts of numerous Mine Action Centers (MACs) and local NGOs in 
order to form one of the most comprehensive mine action programs in the 
world. Operating under the direction of the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), MAPA has 
successfully located and destroyed 1,629,6051andmines/ UXO and cleared 
230,440,706 square meters of mined area and 339,579 ,010 square meters 
of battlefield area. 
by Susanna Sprinkel, MAIC 
Int roduction 
Years of controversy have left Af-
ghanistan as the country most severely 
affected by landmines, with an estimated 
150 to 300 landmine/UXO-related fatal i-
ties each month. T hese artilleries add an 
unnecessary burden to the lives of many 
who already suffer on a daily basis from 
numerous other hardships. As a result, 
Afghanistan has developed one of the 
strongest Mine Action Programs in the 
world. The Mine Action Program for Af-
ghan istan (MAPA) was developed in 
1989 and has been working under super-
vision the of the United Nations O ffi ce 
fo r the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance (UNOCHA) ever since. 
T his program combines the efforts 
of six Mine Acrion Centers (MACs)-
the UN M ine Action Center for Afghani-
stan (MACA) and five Regional Mine 
Action Centers (RMACs) designated in 
the central, southern, northern, eastern and 
western regions of Afghanistan-as well 
as 15 local NGOs in order to provide 
extensive coverage of all areas of mine 
action (for more information on partner 
NGOs, see Table l below). UNOCHA, 
United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) and United Nations Mine Ac-
tion Service (UNMAS) are responsible 
fo r developing the structure of MAPA, 
and they have designated speci fi c respon-
sibilities to each of the bodies involved. 
Coordination of Mine 
Action Activities 
Designated Responsibilities 
UNOCHA, UNDP and UNMAS 
have requested that all mine action ac-
tivities be planned and coordinated by 
MACA and the Mine C learance and 
Planning Agency (MCPA). Specifically, 
these bodies are responsible for the fo l-
lowing operations: 
• Planning all mine action strategies 
and operations. 
• Developing a set of mine action 
standards and policies. 
• Overseeing MAPA activities and 
assuring quali ty. 
• Implementing necessary programs 
and support for field operations. 
• Securing and distributing required 
resources for all mine action programs. 
• Organizing mine action technology. 
• Managing and distributing mine-
related information. 
Goals for 2002 
As outlined in their 2002 Project 
Plan (available at www.mineaction.org), 
the United Nations has establ ished the 
fo llowing goals for coordination activities: 
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•lmplementingaworkplanforall mine 
action activities by contributing bodies. 
• Developing a plan for further ex-
panding MAPA, in order to meet in-
creased demands that have arisen from 
the current political situation in the counoy. 
• Formulating a seven-year plan to 
clear Afghanismn's lands ro a moderate level. 
• Creating a n approach for de-
stroying stockpiles. 
• Supplying periodic reports to do-
nors on the funds received by MAPA. 
• Forming an administrative contract 
among contributing NGOs. 
• Preparing data on the mine threat 
to be used both locally and globally. 
• Providing necessary support to pre-
serve and expand mine action activities 
throughout the region. 
• An Afghan landmine 
detection and 
disposal worker from 
HALO Trust clears 
mines from the 
shoulder of a road. 
c/oAP 
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